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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the economic history of South Africa from the
Second World War to 1960 with the aim of exploring some aspects of the
relationship between apartheid and capitalism from an empirical
perspective. In order to keep the paper as accessible as possible,
the more detailed discussions of economic trends have been relegated
to footnotes. By examining the period immediately preceding the
nationalist election victory and the 12 years afterwards, it is hoped
that important changes and continuities can be highlighted. Trends in
wages and in the share of profit are examined in some detail. The
purpose of this exercise is two-fold; to present a story drawing on
economic trends and stated government policy aims, and to introduce
statistical analysis and simple economics into the debate about the
relationship between apartheid and capitalism.
A particularly disturbing characteristic of South African political
economy is the tendency to regard state economic policy as an
instrument of capitalists and capitalism. Firstly, what is in the
interests of capitalists is not necessarily in the interests of
capitalism. Secondly, governments are often forced to act against the
short-term interests of economic constituencies in order to maintain
macro-economic balance. Thirdly, governments are often ignorant and
ill-advised and as a result, are capable of making disasterous policy
decisions. These points are touched apon in the discussion.
Even more alarming is that claims are frequently made about economic
trends (particularly about the relationship between wages and profits)
without due consideration to what actually happened. The aversion for
dealing with statistics and simple economic relationships which
characterises a great deal of (particularly leftist) analyses, should
be actively combatted by interested historians. Statistical analysis
can shed light on hotly contested issues in the capitalism-apartheid
debate. This paper attempts a preliminary exploration of trends in
wages and profits, drawing implications at various points for the
relationship between apartheid and capitalism1. Unfortunately, as the
national accounts have only been consistently estimated from 1948, the
analysis of the first two post-war peak to peak cycles (1948-55 and
1955-60) is a great deal more detailed than that of the war years.
Wages and Profits Before embarking on the analysis, it is useful to
outline the simple methodology used to deconstruct the relationship
between wages and the profit share. South Africa's output (value
added in production) can be expressed as the wage bill + an operating
surplus (ie profits).
Output (Y) = wages (W) + profits (P)
Consequently the share of output going to workers, ie the wage share
can be expressed as W/Y and the profit share as P/Y
1 = W + P
Y Y
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As the sum of the wage and profit shares must (by definition) equal
unity, it follows that if the wage share rises, the profit share will
fall (and vice versa). If we explore this further, it becomes clear
that if average wages rise faster than output, then the wage share
will rise. In other words, if wage increases are greater than the
growth of the total 'economic pie' (ie Y) then it follows that the pie
slice accrueing to capitalists (the profit share) will be eroded.
These simple concepts underly the economic analysis presented in this
paper2.
The capitalism-apartheid debate The above method, when applied to
South Africa, helps shed light on the question as to whether apartheid
was associated with an economic environment in which the share of the
economic pie going to capitalists got bigger or smaller. The
'radical' analysis of the apartheid-capitalism relation suggested that
labour repression (and the migrant labour system) drove down the wage
bill and thus allowed the share of profit to rise. The 'liberal'
analysis on the other hand stressed that apartheid slowed down the
growth of the economic pie and had a detrimental impact on profits via
increased white wages - although the question as to whether this
caused the profit share to rise or fall was left vague. While
accepting that white wage growth was a problem for capitalists,
'radicals' maintained that the benefits of the political co-operation
of white workers and the division of the working class more than
outweighed any negative effects. The assumption they made was that
the downward pressure on black wages more than compensated for the
upward pressure on white wages exerted by apartheid policies.
Because the 'radical' hypothesis made definite claims about trends in
the wage and profit shares (whereas the 'liberal' analysis focussed
more on the effects on growth and structural change), the statistical
analysis presented in this paper has more bearing on 'radical'
beliefs.
THE PROFIT SHARE 1939-48
The advent of the 2nd World War had a highly stimulating effect on the
South African economy (Robertson, 1954). The reduction of imports
forced and encouraged the development of a local machinery and capital
goods sector (Moll, 1987, p.3) and high demand for South African food,
raw materials, machinery and munitions in the UK and the West
stimulated exports and growth. According to Moll, by the end of the
war, significant structural transformation had taken place and
industry "was beginning to produce a variety of consumption goods and
more advanced goods and machinery via automated production processes,
using local raw materials and technology" (loc.cit). This is
reflected in the fact that the metal products, engineering and
transport equipment group which constituted 19,5% of industrial output
in 1933/4 was contributing 30,4% in 1947/8 (Union Statistics, 1960).
The expansion and structural transformation had a major impact in the
level of black employment in manufacturing. Between 1933/4 and 1947/8
the number of black workers in manufacturing almost trippled - growing
at 8,6% per year (Moll, 1987, p.3). The increased demand for labour
(and especially black labour) had positive ramifications for the
growth in the wage share. The Wage Board (Report for the year 1954,
UG 17-1956) estimates that in 1937,. the manufacturing wage share was
48% (p.32). According to the Botha Commission into Industrial
Legislation (UG 62-1951), this had risen to 55% in 1940 and then to
63% by 1948 (ibid, p.37-38). In other words, over the war years, the
share of profit was eroded by the growth of wage income.
The Botha Commission attributes a great deal of the impetus for this
to the growth of black wages which rose as a percentage of average
white wages from 20,1% in 1938 to 25,0% in 1948 (ibid, p.40). The
narrowing of the black:white wage gap was explained in terms of a
small measure of upward movement of blacks through the occupational
structure and as a result of the narrowing of the gap between the
wages of workers in different classes of skill (ibid, p.47).
The narrowing of the gap between skilled and unskilled wages was
accorded great significance by the Commission. As can be seen from
Table One, the wage gap between unskilled and skilled workers narrowed
significantly in all regions of the country.
Table One: Unskilled Black Wages as % of White Artisan Wages
Region 1938 1950
Cape Peninsula 13,3 22,0
Durban 7,8 13,7
Witwatersrand 6,7 13,7
Source: UG 62-1951, pp.47-49
The Commission pointed out that the trend was consistent with world
wide trends but that in South Africa, the gap was still excessively
large. The Board of Trade and Industries is guoted as saying,that in
the Western World, unskilled wages are seldom less than 30% and seldom
more than 50% of skilled wages (p.47).
The upward pressure on black wages had its roots in the shortages of
skilled and semi-skilled labour during the war. Tight labour market
conditions coupled with war-time emergency regulations, allowed
employers to engage (and train) black workers for jobs normally
occupied by whites. The stimulus to industry presented by the war,
further encouraged the employment of blacks as more semi-skilled jobs
became available due to automation and the re-organisation of the
labour process. According to the Botha Commission:
"The mechanisation of industry created a large number of classes
of work for which a great measure of skill is not necessary and
in which the repetitive character of the work, makes the
employment of natives, in view of their natural characteristics,
more suitable than Europeans... A further reason (is that) this
class of labour was the only one readily available during the war
years" (ibid, p.160) .
According to the Department of Labour's report for 1946 (UG 62-1948),
statistics for industries investigated by the Wage Board between 1937
and 1946 show that semi-skilled jobs represent 18,3% of all jobs and
that only 35,9% of these jobs were European (ibid, p.47). The Report
observed that "Non-Europeans are efficient semi-skilled workers, being
excedingly suitable for the repetitive nature of operative work;
Natives in particular are fond of minding machines and with.the
necessary experience, become excellent machine operators" (loc.cit).
The progression from unskilled to semi-skilled and eventually to
skilled work was seen by the Department as "natural" and the report
predicted that "non-Europeans will in increasing numbers become
skilled workers in the future" (loc.cit).
This process was of course resisted by the white trade unions. In its
submission to the Botha Commission, the Board of Trade and Industries
complained that
"the reclassification of labour categories through the process of
negotiation between labour unions and employer's organisations
has been slow and uncertain. The bargaining powers of the
respective parties rather than the requirements of developing a
manufacturing industry in the Union have been the determining
factor" (ibid, p.63).
Nevertheless, the extent to which skills were diluted and the labour
process re-organised represented according to Webster, xa serious set-
back for the organized working class' (1985, p.56). Employers took
advantage of the situation to link the employment of emergency workers
with a more radical restructuring of the labour process through
mechanisation and deskilling (ibid, p.57). This eroded the strength
of white skilled workers and increased the bargaining position of
those black workers moving into operative and semi-skilled jobs.
The State played an active role in facilitating the dilution of
skilled jobs into semi-skilled jobs where possible. This occured not
only in metal and engineering, but also in the consumer sector3. In
addition, the state, through the activities of the Wage Board, also
made a contribution to the raising of the level of unskilled black
wages. In the Report of the Wage Board for 1940, it was stated that
"in regard to the duty of reporting on classes of employees
entitled to wages on a civilised basis, this has been interpreted
by the Board somewhat liberally it must be admitted, as a
direction that wages are to be recommended on a civilised basis
for so many classes of employees as circumstances may permit" (UG
-45-1941, p.31).
The Report goes on to stress that the Board was particularly concerned
with unskilled wages because "evidence is accumulating that in general
the wages of unskilled workers and often the semi-skilled also are
insufficient for the maintenance of a healthy existence" (loc.cit).
The 1940 Report is remarkable in several respects. Firstly, it adopts
the case of the unskilled worker with overt enthuisiasm and moralism.
A substantial section of the report describes and endorses the
Australian concept of a "living wage" for unskilled workers. There is
an explicit commitment to intervening in the economy on the behalf of
the economically powerless black worker. The Report criticises
employers who made wage increases only in skilled categories simply
because skilled workers were better organised into trade unions.
However, with no small measure of smug satisfaction the Board adds "as
a result of representations by the Department however, matters were
rectified in the majority of cases" (ibid, p.37). This paternalist
interventionist stance, persisted right through the war years.
Secondly, the report stands in sharp contrast with that of the
previous year which stressed that the standard of living of the worker
was only one factor in making a wage determination - the other being
the ability of employers to pay wage increases (UG 36-1940). The 1940
Report by contrast, stated the firm's ability to pay is "relatively
less important where the wages of the lower paid workers are
concerned" (ibid, p.31). There is a clear committment to improving
the level of unskilled wages even if it meant that marginal firms
would go out of business. "
In other words, in its general policy, the Department of Labour and
the Wage Board acted to protect (and even strengthen) the bargaining
power of black unskilled labour and to facilitate the upward
penetration of black labour through the occupational structure.
Through minimum wage legislation and cost-of-living allowances (which
were regressive and favoured lower incomes4) the Wage Board
contributed to the narrowing of the black:white wage differential
(Spandau, 1972, p.380).
The immediate question which presents itself is why average white
wages should not have risen as fast, particularly given the serious
shortage of skilled and artisanal labour. Firstly, the bargaining
power of white labour was not as strong as it might have been under
the circumstances. War measure no.9 of 1942 (which lasted until the
cessation of hostilities in 1945) prohibited strike action by white
workers. Furthermore, wages were frozen in many strategic industries.
While similar legislation affected black industrial action (war
measure no.145 of 1942), unskilled black workers at least had some
protection from the paternalistic Wage Board and Department of Labour.
Secondly, from 1941 to 1945 the government Controller of Industrial
Manpower was empowered to "control" strategic industries so as to
"yield the best results in the interests of the defence of the Union
(and maintain) supplies and services essential to the life of the
community" (Dept of Labour Report for 1941 - no UG number, p.4). This
reduced the bargaining power of certain artisans as the main object of
controlling industries (mainly engineering, building, stevedoring,
boot and shoe manufacture) was to prevent the poaching of skilled
labour by private industry5.
The Controller of Industrial Manpower also contributed to the dilution
of skilled jobs. According to Spandau;
"The bulk of the Controller's work lay in the engineering
industry where skilled wages were frozen in November, 1941. At
the same time, there was considerable work dilution in the
engineering and munitions industries, whereby skilled artisans
were replaced by a number of operatives whom they directed and
whose work was of a simple nature - usually one operation.
Careful factory lay-outs and single purpose lathes helped achieve
such dilution. As the dilutees were normally non-whites, their
productivity was considerably increased" (1972, p.381).
Spandau concludes that "in the case of the dominant engineering sector
the evidence suggests that the Wage Board's actions were of secondary
importance in bringing about changes in the wage structure, compared
with the direct-control measures exercised by the Controller of
Industrial Manpower" (loc.cit).
Thirdly, the Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act of 1941
limited the number of hours that skilled workers could work overtime
in response to skilled labour shortages. The working week was reduced
from 54 to 46 hours and the maximum (ie including overtime) from 60 to
54 hours (Dept of Labour Report for 1941, p.5). This prevented white
skilled workers from cashing in on the labour scarcity by working
longer hours.
Fourthly, the use of "emergency" workers in war-time manufacturing
reduced the average white wage because most of these workers were
female (Dept of Labour Report for 1941, p.5).
In short, during the war, black unskilled and semi-skilled labour was
better able to make real gains than white skilled labour. Both the
forces of economic demand and institutional factors played a role in
developments which resulted not only in the narrowing of racial income
differentials, but also in the rise of the wage share at the cost of
the profit share. However, in the period after the war, particularly
from 1948, the balance between workers and capitalists shifted in
favour of capital, and the balance between white and black workers
shifted in favour of the former. White skilled workers experienced
real wage growth whereas the real income of black workers declined
sufficiently to ensure a rise in the profit share. As the abrupt
reversal in the relative fortunes of black and white workers co-
incided with the coming to power of the Nationalists, the period 1948-
55 is worth examining in some detail.
THE PROFIT SHARE: 1948-55
Between 1948 and 1955, the economy grew at 4,6% p.a. and manufacturing
grew at 7,7% p.a. Rapid growth however soon came up against the
constraints of skill and materials bottlenecks and demand-induced
inflation plagued the economy as a result. The main beneficiaries of
the economic climate were white skilled workers and capitalists. This
can be seen Table Two which provides statistics on variables central
to understanding the relationship between trends in wages, output and
the profit share.
Table Two: Trends in SA Manufacturing: 1948-55
Average annual com- White Coloured Black Total
pound growth rate & Indian




Sources: Published and unpublished information from the Central
Statistical Services and the South African Reserve Bank. More
detail is available on request. See footnote two for the measure of
available output and wages.
The above table shows that the share of available output going to
capitalists (ie the profit share) increased over the period 1948-55
and conversely, the share of output going to workers (ie the wage
share) decreased. These trends are in sharp contrast to those during
the war years. Furthermore, they are also in sharp contrast to trends
in the rest of the post-war period. I have shown elsewhere that for
the period from 1955, with the exception of 1975-81, the wage share
rose at the cost of the profit share (Nattrass, 1989, 1990). 1948-55
is thus a particularly interesting period.
Between 1948 and 1955, the wage share fell because total average wages
grew" slower than available output (ie the total economic pie to" be
divided between workers and capitalists). However, the relative
fortunes of the various racial categories varied enormously. White
workers wages increased faster than the available output. In other
words, if all output was produced by white workers, the wage share
would have risen - to the detriment of the profit share. However,
black and coloured & Indian wages actually fell over the period to
such an extent that the rise in white wages was neutralised. Total
average wages grew slower than available output and the profit share
rose.
In short, for the period 1948-55, capitalists and white workers
benefitted at the expense of black, coloured and Indian workers. The
'radical' hypothesis that apartheid facilitated rising white wages and
rising profitability via the increased exploitation of the black
working class, is thus supported for this period. That these trends
are effectively a reversal of those during the war under the United
Party government, appears to strengthen the case even further.
Furthermore, the idea that apartheid policy from 1948 represented a
solution to an 'organic crisis' in the 1940s (Saul and Gelb, 1981) in
so far as it suppressed the black working class and re-laid the
conditions for succesfull accumulation, is apparantly bolstered by
these trends.
But how exactly did this dramatic turnaround take place? What were
the factors which reversed the relative fortunes of black and white
workers? While some trends would have been affected by shifts in
government policy, they also had their roots in economic structural
changes taking place and had little to do with institutional or policy
changes from 1948.
For example, the re-absorbtion of white servicemen into the economy
reduced the pressure on employees to engage blacks in semi-skilled and
skilled work. This would have had a downward effect on the level of
black wages. Also, the movement of women out of the labour market as
the war ended, no doubt played a role in increasing the average white
wage in industry.
Even the attitude of the Wage Board, which by 1948 was decidedly less
in favour of increasing black unskilled wages, had changed prior to
the Nationalist Party coming to power. For example, in the Dept of
Labour Report for 1946 (UG 62-1948) the Wage Board stressed that
"It will be to the benefit of all concerned if representatives of
non-European workers, mostly labourers, were to realise an
appreciate that with the present economic development of the
country, a general minimum rate of 3 pounds a week for unskilled
work, which is usually proposed by these representatives, would
be fatal to the general interests of the country, including those
of labourers" (ibid, p.32).
This attitude permeated Wage and Labour Board reports from 1946. The
shift may have occurred earlier but given the disruption to government
report production during the war, government attitudes from 1942 to
1945 are an open question.
In the 1948 Report (UG 50-1950) the Wage Board argued that the
continued call for 3 pounds a week "can only be regarded as
revolutionary" (ibid, p.33). This they argued, despite evidence
presented by the Report of the non-European Bus Service Commission
(1946) which argued that a black Johannesburg family required 12
pounds, 18 shillings and 6 pence week, which at current wages implied
a shortfall of 5 pounds 15 shillings and 11 pence a week (as discussed
by the Wage Board in the 1948 Report, p.33).
Although the Wage Board's concern to support the level of black
unskilled wages had waned soon after the end of the war, the racist
approach of the nationalist government almost certainly strengthened
that tendency. By 1948 the Wage Board had shifted well away from its
stance in the 1940 Report. The moralistic argument that unskilled
wages be increased even if marginal firms could not afford it, had
been completely abandoned. Rather than stressing the needs of
workers, the Board argued in its Report for 1948,
"the emphasis should ... rest on improvement of the standard of
efficiency and output of the lower paid worker, it being
economically unsound that he be remunerated at a level above his
value. If the unskilled worker strives to better his output of
work and reaches the stage where more reliance can be placed on
him by his employer, he will presumably be in a position to
command a higher wage" (ibid, p.50).
The paternalistic approach had shifted to one blaming the worker for
the existing level of wages;
"The tendency of unskilled workers, more particularly natives, to
migrate from one form of employment to another, rather than
remain in service and improve their efficiency and knowledge by
specialisation, is one of the main features militating against
the general advancement of wages of unskilled workers of this
race" (ibid, p.33-34).
By 1954, the Board was arguing that the tendency to wage equality was
only desirable if it increased productivity and did not reduce the
incentive to aquire skills (UG 46-1954). Thus efforts to improve the
postion of the unskilled worker will always be "strictly circumscribed
and limited by economic factors" (ibid, p.29). According to the
Board, "the process of improvement will have to be gradual in order to
correspond with the increased contribution of the unskilled worker to
production, and with the ability of individual industries to pay
increased rates of remuneration" (loc.cit). Between 1950 and 1956,
the Board made less than an average of one minimum wage determination
a year, made no determination limited to unskilled workers in
specified industries and there were hardly any improvements in the
prescribed wage rate minima (Pursell, 1971, p.40).
The shift away from positive intervention on the behalf of the
unskilled black worker had a very real impact on the level of black
wages. Inflation (which averaged 5,5% per annum) between 1948 and
19556, bit hard into black living standards. However, it is important
to bear in mind that the depression of black wages was primarily the
result of non-intervention rather than active and malevolent state
strategy. To a large extent, the market did the government's dirty
work for it.
The exception is of course the continued suppression of black trade
unions. However, the form it took over the period 1948-55 was simply
the extension of repressive measures promulgated during the war7.
Restrictions on the right of black workers to organise and strike
(only marginally eased in 1953) certainly contributed to the erosion
of the economic muscle of black workers. However, adverse labour
market conditions were more telling. It is doubtfull whether
unrestricted black unions would have been able to prevent the downward
slide of black wages.
As urbanisation (which had escalated noticeably during the war)
continued apace despite government rhetoric, the labour market for
unskilled black labour was relatively depressed between 1948 and 1955.
As Hindson has shown, up until the late 1950s apartheid labour
controls were only partially effective (1987, p.65). This implies
that the black urban working class was not afforded protection from
competition from their rapidly urbanising unskilled rural compatriots.
The influx of unskilled labour to urban areas (technically against
nationalist stated policy) coupled with the restrictions on black
trade union organisation had extremely negative consequences for black
bargaining power.
It is important to bear in mind that the performance of the economy
over the period also had an impact on the rate of growth of wages and
profits and on the policy of the Wage Board. Deflationary policies in
response to balance of payments disequilibria, and rising import and
material prices placed great strain on manufacturing profitability.
Faced with a stronger white trade union movement than had existed
during the war, firms concentrated on reducing costs by focussing on
relatively powerless black labour - made more powerless by the slower
rate of growth which reduced the pressure on the black semi-skilled
and unskilled labour markets. That the Wage Board acquiesced in this
is symptomatic of the overall policy objective of fostering economic
growth under conditions of relatively stable prices (Spandau, 1972,
p.383).
The role of government economic policy and it's effects on capitalist
profitability and growth is a very under-researched area. Whereas
government intervention in the labour market can more easily be
explained in terms of political pressure (from white workers and
capitalists), the relationships between class interests, economic
policy and outcome are opaque and indeterminate in the broadly defined
economic policy sphere. In many important respects, the structural
problems facing the economy which manifested themselves in high
inflation and balance of payments disequilibria were those which would
have faced any government and would probably have been dealt with in
pretty much the same way. Likewise, the limited instruments available
to the state in exercising monetary policy would have confounded any
government attempting to combat inflation by restricting credit.
However, there are aspects of nationalist policy over the period which
are of particular interest to the questions addressed in this paper.
Firstly, the government had a clear preference for deflating the
economy in order to cope with demand induced inflation8. The
alternative of allowing the skills shortage (an important constraint
on growth9) to be alleviated by facilitating upward mobility and
training of black workers was explicitly rejected. The corollary of
this was that the potential of an expanding black market as an impetus
for growth was also not developed. This meant that markets for
domestic capitalists had to be secured by restricting foreign
competition. The Viljoen Commission in justifying a pro-protection
stance, observed the following:
"It was maintained by the representatives of organised industry
that entrepreneurs would not be prepared to invest capital to an
extent sufficient to ensure the renewed rapid development of the
country's economy unless they were assured of a sufficient share
of the limited South African market so that production could be
planned and unit costs reduced to a level comparable with that of
overseas manufacturers with much larger home markets" (UG
36/1958, p.6).
The option of protecting the domestic market carried with it positive
and negative consequences. According to Zarenda (1977, p.110) import
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substitution was the major stimulus to growth up until 1957. However,
protection also encouraged inefficiency and high production cost
structures in manufacturing.
Secondly, the government's naive and suspicious attitude to capital
inflow10 coupled with the uncertainty generated by statements relating
to labour policy, militated against the rapid growth of domestic and
foreign investment. The weak balance of payments position was
further exacerbated by government's reluctance to devalue the South
African pound. According to Moll (1987), South Africa, for reasons
relating to national pride, chose to maintain parity with the UK pound
- a decision which resulted in an over-valued exchange rate. This
cheapened imports and limited structural change towards export
production.
This raises an interesting point about the distinction between the
interests of capitalists and the development of capitalism.
Government policy may have been in the short term interests of
individual capitalists (who could afford cheap imported inputs while
languishing behind tariff walls) but in so far as it dulled the
competitive pressures necessary for healthy structural transformation,
the long term interests of capitalism were harmed. The distinction
between questions concerning the relationship between apartheid and
capitalists and between apartheid and capitalism, often fails to be
made clearly and is responsible for a great deal of the communication
breakdown between marxist scholars and classical economists.
For example, when xliberal' economists point out that apartheid slowed
down the process of structural transformation, they are making a point
about the relationship between apartheid and capitalism. When
xradicals' show how state policies responded to the particular needs
of certain fractions of capital, they are making a point about the
relationship between apartheid and capitalists. Both positions can be
simultaneously correct. Both Marx and neo-classical economists accept
that what may be in the interests of individual capitalists can
actually undermine the dynamism of the capitalist system itself.
THE PROFIT SHARE: 1955-60
Growth during 1955-60 was slower and more stable than the preceding
period. The main impetus for the boom part of the cycle (1956/7) came
from the Suez crisis which boosted demand for South Afican wool, coal
and uranium. Rapid growth was however, shortlived as the old problem
of balance of payments diseguilibria re-asserted itself. Import
controls and restrictive monetary and fiscal policy were once again
introduced.
In sharp contrast to the trends in the previous period, the profit
share was eroded by the growth in wage income. As can be seen in
Table Four, white and black wages rose faster than the output
available for distribution between wages and profits. This time, the
rapid growth of white wages was not compensated for by slower growing
or declining black wages.
11
Table Three: Trends in SA Manufacturing: 1955-60
Average annual com- White Coloured Black Total
pound growth rate & Indian
Wages 5,3 3,5 3,9 4,2
Available Output 3,8
Wage Share 0,4
Profit Share ,*. -0,7
Sources: See Table Two
Although black and white wage growth contributed to the decline in the
profit share, the significant strength of white workers can be seen in
the further widening of the black:white wage gap. The use of black
workers in operative and semi-skilled tasks where possible, probably
underlies the rise in black wages. Manufacturing industry was
becoming increasingly reliant on automated process involving the use
of stable semi-skilled labour rather than undifferentiated unskilled
labour. This, no doubt, led to firms competing for semi-skilled
workers with urban residential rights and hence to the rise in wages.
At the same time, there is some evidence that Wage Board policy was
from 1957, once again becoming more cognisant of the need to increase
black earnings (Pursell, 1968). Pursell found that in the
manufacturing sector, "most determinations increased Bantu real
earnings, the actual increase ranging from slight improvements to
substantial increases" (ibid, p.90). This finding was mirrored for
unskilled labour in general11.
The rise in white wages again, can be traced to the bargaining power
of white skilled workers. In the context of a scarcity of skilled
labour, keen competition between employers places exceptional upward
pressure on skilled wages - despite the often poorly qualified
character of artisan labour in South Africa12.
Interestingly enough, the Department of Labour during the mid 1950s
started making broad hints to the effect that increases in white wages
well in excess of productivity was becoming a serious economic problem
(see Report for the year 1954, ie UG 17/1956 and for 1955, ie UG
21/1957). However, despite the Department of Labour's lobbying for
the introduction of production incentives and improved training
facilities, not much inroad was made into the power of white workers.
Rather, job reservation (in terms of Section 77 of the 1956 Industrial
Concilliation Act) was added to the armoury of the white working
class.
THE RATE OF PROFIT
We have seen that between 1948 and 1955, the share of profit going to
capitalists actually increased because the decline in black wages more
than compensated for the increase in white wages. However, not all
was well as far as capitalist development was concerned. Skill
shortages, import and price controls coupled with a crisis in investor
confidence were clearly resented by capitalists. Furthermore, the
effects that this had in the form of increased costs had an extremely
12
negative impact on manufacturing profitability.
At this point it is necessary to move beyond our initial analysis of
the profit share and extend it to that of the rate of profit. The
rate of profit (ie the rate of return on capital invested) can be
expressed as the product of the profit share and the output:capital
ratio.
P = P . Y
K Y K
In other words, trends in the profit share are only one aspect of the
measure of profitability. Trends in the productivity of the capital
stock (ie Y/K, the output:capital ratio) are also of great importance.
Between 1948 and 1955, the output:capital ratio in South African
manufacturing declined by 2,5% p.a (Nattrass, 1990). This drop in the
productivity of capital was so great as to neutralise the rise in the
profit share. As a result, the rate of profit declined by 1,8% p.a.
over the period (loc.cit).
Why did the output:capital ratio decline? Preliminary statistical
investigation indicates that the major factor underlying this adverse
trend was the rapid rise in input prices relative to output prices.
In other words, the rise in the cost of materials was not, balanced by
a corresponding rise in the price capitalists could get for their
products on the market. Capitalists were unable to pass on their cost
increases to the consumer and hence their profits were squeezed.
This leads us to two further questions; why did input costs rise, and
why could capitalists not pass oh their increased costs? In answer to
the first question, the import controls13 (which reduced the supply of
available imported inputs) and the devaluation (which increased the
price of imports) no doubt were a major contributing factor.
Likewise, import substitution policy protected some industries but
negatively affected those relient on inputs from protected industries.
In answer to the second question, the price controls14 instigated by
the authorities at several points during the period would have served
to prevent capitalists from fuelling inflation through price
increases.
In this respect, inflation and government policy had a detrimental
impact on both black workers and capitalists. Inflation reduced the
real cost of black labour (which was good for the profit share) but it
(in conjuncture with policies to control prices and protect the
balance of payments) had a detrimental effect on the output:capital
ratio and hence also on the rate of profit. To the extent that
government attitudes to foreign capital exacerbated the balance of
payments problems and to the extent that the government chose to
deflate the economy rather than allowing the skills shortage to be
absorbed by black labour, one can conclude that the interests of
capitalists were ambiguously served by apartheid economic policy.
The Rate of Profit: 1955-60 Over the period 1948-55, we saw that the
rate of profit fell (by 1,8% p.a.), despite positive trends in the
profit share. This was largely due to adverse movements in relative
prices. For the period 1955-60, the profit rate declined even faster
(by 2% p.a.) although for different reasons as the input cost squeeze
had abated relative to the earlier period. Between 1955 and 1960 the
erosion of the profit share, declines in the productivity of capital
and adverse movements in relative prices all contributed equally to
the decline in profitability.
13
Most of the influences on the rate of profit discussed above for the
1948-55 period were present (although to different degrees) in the
1955-60 period. Import and price controls had lessened and the
bargaining power of white workers had increased. Nevertheless,
despite the increase in the white:black wage gap, black workers were
able to erode the share of profit with the wage increases they
secured.
WHAT ABOUT MINING AND THE REST OF THE ECONOMY?
At this point the following objection could be raised, ie that I have
limited my analysis to the manufacturing sector when mining is just as
crucial. Indeed, as some maintain, the main point of apartheid from
1948 was to ensure an adequate supply of cheap migrant labour to the
mines (and to a lesser extent to industry). Those who stress that the
main benefit of apartheid to capitalists was via the maintenance of
the migrant labour system, would clearly like to see an analysis which
includes the mining sector - South Africa's biggest user of migrant
labour.
The relationship between mining and manufacturing is of course
complex, being simultaneously competitive (eg for labour),
complementary (there are strong foreward and backward linkages between
the sectors1 ) and conflictual (eg over the pricing of inputs from one
sector to another). For this reason, theories which model the South
African political economy in terms of competing fractions of capital,
often tend to misrepresent economic realities. Nevertheless, as a
rough indication of how mining capitalist fared, a preliminary sketch
of central trends in wages and the profit share in the mining industry
between 1948 and 1960 is provided below.
Table Four: Trends in SA Mining: 1948-60
1948-1955 1955-1960
Average annual com- White Black Total White Black Total
pound growth rate
Wages 1,2 -1,3 1,3 3,0 1,8 0,9
Available Output 3,1 4,1
Wage Share -1,8 -3,2
Profit Share 3,3 4,1
Sources: See Table Two
As with the manufacturing sector, black wages declined in real terms
over the period 1948-55. White wages increased, and as they
constitute such a large portion of the total wage bill, so did total
average wages. Nevertheless, as the output available for distribution
between wages and profits increased faster than the growth of average
wages, the wage share fell and the profit share rose.
However, as pointed out above, trends in the share of profit are only
one side of the story - the other important measure being the rate of
profit. Again, just as occurred in the manufacturing sector, adverse
trends in the output:capital ratio worked against capitalist
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profitability between 1948 and 1955. The high rate of growth in
capital investment (due to the expansion of the OFS gold fields)
coupled with shortages of labour resulted in a decline in the
productivity of capital such that the rate of profit remained constant
over the period16. In other words, the mining sector fared better
than the manufacturing sector between 1948 and 1955, but again, the
performance of its profit rate was far from scintilating.
However, between 1955 and 1960, trends in the output:capital ratio and
in the profit share were favourable to mining capital. As shown in
the table above, available output grew faster than both black and
white wages to the extent that the profit share grew at 4,1% per
annum. More importantly, the output:capital ratio increased at 2,9 %
per annum primarily because the vast investment made in the earlier
period had started to pay dividends. The rate of profit in mining
thus grew at a stunning 7,2% per annum. The contrast between the
growth of mining and manufacturing profitability in the period 1955-60
is thus marked indeed.
This raises the interesting question as to whether the xbalance'
between the performance of the mining and manufacturing sectors was
such that * overall' the South African economy showed rising
profitability. As can be seen in Table Five, this is not the case.
Table Five: Comparative Average Annual Profit Rates
Period Manufacturing Mining 'Core' Sector
1945-55 -1,8% 0,0% -2,7%
1955-60 -2,0% 7,2% -0,6%
Source: See Table Two. NB: The 'Core' sector comprises mining
and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, electricity gas and
water, and commerce catering and accommodation.
Table Five shows the comparative profitability growth performance of
the manufacturing, mining and 'core' sectors of the economy. The core
sector is the largest meaningful conglomeration of sectors as far as
measuring profitability is concerned . It comprises the following
sectors: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction,
electricity gas and water, and commerce catering and accommodation.
In 1955 the core sector contributed 52% of total output in the economy
(mining and manufacturing together comprised only 32%). The core
sector can be regarded as broadly representative of the dynamic
capitalist sectors of the economy.
The above table indicates that overall profitability was falling in
both periods after 1948, although more rapidly in the earlier period.
To an important extent, the profitability of the mining sector
compensated for the decline in the rate of profit in manufacturing.
However, it was not enough to prevent the core rate of profit from
declining - albeit at the slow rate of 0,6% p.a.
CONCLUSION
This paper raises more questions than it answers. However, it also
makes a couple of substantive observations. The first is that
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economic statistical analysis can shed light on what the relationship
between wages and profits actually was in the early apartheid era. In
short, it was found that although the decline in black wages
compensated for the increase in white wages between 1948 and 1955, the
rate of profit declined in manufacturing. Between 1955 and 1960, the
rate of profit declined even faster as black wage growth contributed
to, rather than compensated for, the growth in white wages. Some data
on the mining industry and the *core' sector of the economy was also
provided. Despite the cushioning effect of rising mining
profitability during 1955-60, it was found that the general trend in
profitability in the capitalist sector was downwards. It is thus
mistaken to argue that the profit rate rose between 1948-55. However,
for the period 1948-55, the figures do support the limited claim that
the decline in black wages compensated for the increase in white wages
such that the profit share rose.
The second substantive observation concerns the role of government
economic policy. So far, the debate about the relationship between
capitalism and apartheid has been dominated by a focus on government
labour policy and the (assumed) relationship this has with
profitability. However, capitalists are affected by a wide range of
government policy on the economy - especially monetary and fiscal
policy. It is thus possible that government labour policy (as in the
period 1948-55) was in the narrowly defined short term interests of
capitalists (in the sense that the wage share fell) but that
government macro-economic policy (such as excessive deflation and
misguided exchange rate policies) worked against capitalist
profitability. Untangling what exactly the overall effect of
government economic policy was, would be practically impossible. The
point is simply that ungualified statements about government policy
being good or bad for capitalists is bad theory and should be avoided.
If we are to progress at all in our understanding of the historical
relationship between apartheid and capitalism, a great deal more
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NOTES
However, it is important to bear in mind what this statistical analysis can.
not resolve. There are simply too many factors (measureable and
immeasurable) at work to be able to come up with the 'answer' to the
question of the relationship between capitalism and apartheid. All
one can conclude from the statistics is whether they are consistent or
not with theoretical interpretations which have clear implications for
the distribution of wages and profits. On a minimalist level, the
statistics limit the kinds of claims that economic historians can
make; for instance, if the statistics show a declining profit share,
one cannot claim that apartheid caused it to rise. On another level,
by examining in more detail why the wage gap narrowed in the war years
and then widened between 1948 and 1950, more information can be gained
to inform analyses of the dynamics of South African capitalism over
the period.
1) The rate of growth of output available for distribution between wages
and profits is approximated as the rate of growth of productivity
adjusted for relative input-ouput prices.
2) The rate of growth of wages is approximated as the rate of
growth of product wages - ie current wages deflated by the production
price index so as to get a more accurate measure of the cost to
capitalists of employing labour.
For a discussion of sources and data manipulations, see the
footnotes to Nattrass, 1989, pp.76-9.
For example, the Wage Board.investigated the Baking Industry in 1938
recommended the introduction of semi-skilled grades for black workers.
According to the Botha Commission "The adoption of this recommendation
resulted in a dilution of labour ... that is, the work of a baker was
divided between European bakers and non-European bakers assistants,
the latter doing the less responsible work. In this way, less bakers
were employed" (ibid, p.159). A witness investigated by the Commision
complained that in the Baking Industry, the result has been that
"workers who are semi-skilled are really doing journeyman's work,
although they are paid a lower rate" (loc.cit).
For example, according to War Measure No.38 of 1942, the cost of living
allowance was
(1) 3s. per week if the ordinary weekly remuneration exceded 20s.
but did not exceed 40s., and
(2) 7s. 6d. if the ordinary weekly remuneration exceeded 80s. (with
not upper limit at all) (quoted in Spandau, 1972, p.380). As Spandau
argues, the cost-of-living allowances were "still sufficiently
regressive to bring about a noticeable equalisation in the racial
distribution of incomes" (loc.cit). Spandau argues that War Measures
Nos 69 and 80 of 1945 were still more regressive (loc.cit).
From 1941-5, the Controller of Industrial Manpower had far-reaching powers
which included declaring industries as controlled, prohibiting the
engagement, resignation or discharge without his prior consent, in a
controlled industry, of any specified employee or class of employee
and regulating wages subject to industrial agreements (Official Year
Book, no.29, 1956/7, p.859).
Inflation was, as minister Havenga pointed out, largely the result of a
legacy of war-related shortages and "the unprecedented development in
the field of both mining and secondary industry, which multiplied the
demand for labour goods and services without making any immediate
contribution to the volume of goods available for consumption"
18
(Hansard, Budget Speech, vol.84, 1954, p.2615). However, the state
was also to a large extent responsible for fuelling these pressures.
In 1952 and 1953 the government had embarked on heavy infrastructural
and Public Corporation based investment projects. 1952 saw the launch
of SASOL (South African Coal Oil and Gas Corporation) the expansion of
ISCOR and the rise in Gross Domestic Investment in 1953 can be
attributed to state sponsored projects such as South African Railways
and Harbours (SAR+H), Escom (Electicity Supply Commission), SASOL,
FOSCOR etc (SARBQB, March 1954, Du Plessis 1963, p.xiv-xvii).
Furthermore, increased levels of government spending on improved
social services (for poor whites) and benefits and defence expenditure
associated with the Korean war (SARB, 1971, p.54) also contributed to
inflationary pressures.
These demand side pressures were however, exacerbated by the
extension of bank credit to the private sector which increased by 32%
between 1947 and 1948. This gave further inflationary impetus to the
economy despite the price controls instigated in the early post-war
period. Between 1950 and 1954, bank credit to the private sector
jumped from R470,7 million to R578,3 million, inspite of the Reserve
Bank's ineffectual pleading to restrict credit for the purposes of
financing consumer credit, speculative transactions or the provision
of fixed capital for less productive purposes (SARB, 1971, p.55).
During the war years, both white and black workers were denied the right to
strike. Whites were restricted by War Measure no.145 of 1942 and
blacks by War Measure no.145 of 1942. Whereas the restrictions
against whites were withdrawn in 1947 (UG 38/1949), those against
blacks were extended by the War Measures Further Continuation Act of
1948 and again in 1950 (UG 71/1951) until the machinery created by the
Native labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 came into force.
The 1949 budget introduced severe austerity measures in order to deflate
the economy so as to reduce the demand for imports and protect the
balance of payments. Minister Havenga argued: "we are no longer
living in a lotus eating land. It will be our task in the years to
come to pay for our high standard of living in recent years. The
sooner we settle the account the sooner will our development go ahead"
(Hansard, vol.66, 1949, pp.21-22). The drastic cuts introduced
contributed by the SARB's own admission, to the downswing that year
(see SARBQB, no.15, March 1950). It was only after the South African
pound was devalued that the economy was able to pick up again.
Government deflationary policies ended the boom in 1953 as well.
Government spending was cut in the 1952/53 Budget which was geared
primarily at attacking the "darkening shadow of inflation" (Havenga in
Hansard, vol.78, 1952, p.3406). Import controls were also instigated
to protect the BOPs. The slowdown of 1952/53 has been attributed
largely to these attempts to curb inflation (J. Nattrass, 1988, p.25)
but world-wide deflation also played a role in reducing the demand for
South Africa's exports and the availability of foreign investment.
Similarly, in the light of the BOP difficulties coupled with "an
acute labour shortage and a gradually increasing price structure"
(SARBQB, March 1956) monetary measures (such as higher interest rates
and requests to banks to restrict credit) and fiscal measures (such as
increased levels of taxation) were resorted to which pulled the
economy down from its 1955 peak.
Shortages of skilled labour plagued the economy throughout the period.
Although immigration continued on a considerabe scale, "it effected an
improvement in the number of employees only in certain industries such
as ... the building industry" (Commerce and Industry. April, 1949.
p.387). These shortages, particularly those in the mining industry
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have been cited as a further reason for the slowdown. The fact that
the gold output of already existing mines fell after the OFS mines
came on-line at the end of 1951 and the Western Transvaal mines in
1952, "reflects the combined shortage of labour on the mines" (SARBQB,
March 1953). This pattern continued into 1953 (SARBQB, March 1954) ^t
but by late 1954, the shortage had been resolved (SARBQB, March 1955).
10 Despite the weakness of the current account and the concommitant need for
capital inflow, the government manifested a bearish attitude to ,<•
foreign investment. In March 1948, steps were taken to restrict
transfers of capital from the rest of the Sterling Area to SA. The
inflow of capital was distrusted for reasons other than inflation.
According to the new minister of finance, (Mnr Havenga) the "chasing
to and fro of refugee capital" was in part to blame for SA's
dificulties because "when it comes it creates exagerated expectations
and when it takes flight, it leaves in the lurch those who relied upon
it" (Budget Speech, Hansard, vol.66, 1949, p.2138). This attitude was
entirely consistent with the anti-foreigner, anti-foreign investment,
economic nationalist position of the NP in its early years.
The inflow of capital declined during 1948 and 1949, probably due in
large part to the governments anti-"refugee capital" policy and indeed
in response to the election of the HNP in 1948. The anti-capitalist,
anti-english rhetoric of Malan resulted in a crisis in confidence in
the business community after his election. The HNP's suspicion of
foreign capital and foreign owned business enterprises, coupled with a
fairly isolationist economic stance, fuelled the problem.
11 According to Pursell;
"The most conspicuous feature of the determinations for unskilled
work made between 1958-60 was the number of trades where
substantial increases in real earning occurred as a result of the
Board's prescribed minima. For example, on the Witwatersrand
labourers' average real incomes were improved by 20.0 per cent or
more in seven trades, by 10.0 to 19.9 per cent in three trades,
and by 5.0 per cent or less in the remaining six trades" (ibid.,
p.92).
12 The Department of Labour writes
"Another disquieting feature of the present position is that in a
world of increasing technical complexity, the incentive for
employees to qualify technically is not very strong when
employers are desparate for workers, unqualified or poorly
qualified workmen are sometimes employed at wages which they
could not possibly command in a competitive market" (UG 17/1956,
p.3).
13 The main policy instrument adopted by the UP and HNP governments to combat
BOP difficulties were import controls. Importers were given a quota
of, non-sterling exchange equal to 50% of the amount spent on non-
sterling imports during 1947. Nevertheless, imports continued to rise
in 1948, largely as a result of the demand for producer goods in
connection with the opening of the new gold fields (De Kock, 1950,
p.63). Further restrictions involving a system of import licences for
imports from the Sterling Area, commodity control in respect of non-
sterling imports and on extension of the list of prohibited imports
occured in 1949 (SARB, 1971, p.51). When the BOP came under
increasing pressure in 1952 and 1955, import controls were once more
instigated.
14 The effect of price controls was particularly strong during 1949-1951.
Price controls had been introduced to provide a buffer against the
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inflationary pressures caused by the restriction of imports and the
strong inflow of capital following devaluation in 1949.
15 See Lombard and Stadler, 1980.
16 The output:capital ratio declined by 3,3% p.a. and the profit share rose
by 3,3% p.a., thus resulting in a constant rate of profit.
17 The sectors which have not been included are
1) The transport, storage and communication sector which is dominated
by state monopolies measuring their capital stock in an unreliable way
(ie at historic rather than replacement cost)
2) Finance, real estate and business services, and government
community social and personal services, ie sectors which have little
capital equipment and hence measuring rates of return on capital is
meaningless.
3) The residual sector known as xOther' in the national accounts.
4) Agriculture - the measurement of capital is suspect in this
sector.
